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Incident Response

Status: Operational baseline. This document defines the recommended incident-handling process. Assign incident owners, verify escalation channels, and approve severity thresholds before relying on it during a production incident.

1. Purpose and objectives

This runbook establishes a consistent process for identifying, assessing, containing, investigating, and resolving incidents affecting WhiteLotusAI.

The objectives are to:

  • Protect users, credentials, enterprise documents, and connected-provider data.
  • Limit service disruption and prevent further unauthorized access.
  • Preserve reliable evidence for investigation and applicable compliance obligations.
  • Restore service only after relevant security and operational controls are verified.
  • Communicate impact and recovery status through approved channels.
  • Prevent recurrence through documented corrective actions and regression testing.

2. Scope

This procedure applies to incidents involving:

  • Frontend, REST API gateway, authentication, and authorization.
  • Chat orchestration, AI model execution, tool dispatch, and agent workflows.
  • Document ingestion, retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), and vector storage.
  • User and session processing, databases, caches, message queues, and service communication.
  • OAuth credentials, integration tokens, and connected enterprise providers.
  • Deployment configuration, infrastructure, dependencies, and CI/CD pipelines.
  • Confidentiality, integrity, availability, or privacy of enterprise data.

3. Severity classification

Assign severity according to the actual impact, scope, exposure, and urgency. When evidence is incomplete, use the higher plausible severity until the risk is understood.

Severity Classification Example Initial response
SEV-1 Critical Confirmed credential compromise, cross-user data disclosure, unauthorized privileged access, or uncontrolled sensitive-data exposure Immediate containment and security escalation
SEV-2 High Major service outage, widespread authentication failure, or significant integration disruption Urgent investigation and recovery
SEV-3 Moderate Limited service degradation, isolated integration failure, or a problem with a viable workaround Prioritized investigation
SEV-4 Low Minor defect, documentation issue, or low-impact operational problem Schedule corrective work

Severity should be reassessed whenever new evidence changes the estimated impact.

Security incidents take priority

A suspected authorization bypass, cross-tenant data exposure, leaked OAuth token, or unauthorized tool execution must be treated as a potential security incident even when the visible service impact appears small.

Response-time targets

Define approved acknowledgement, escalation, and recovery targets separately. The classifications above are a baseline, not a claim that specific response-time commitments or on-call coverage already exist.

4. Roles and responsibilities

Assign named people and verified contact channels in the organization's operational directory. One person may perform multiple roles in a small team, provided that responsibilities remain explicit.

Role Responsibilities
Incident commander Coordinates response, assigns priorities, maintains the timeline, and authorizes operational decisions
Technical responder Diagnoses affected services, implements containment, and coordinates recovery
Security lead Assesses exposure, directs security investigation, and validates security-related remediation
Communications owner Prepares approved stakeholder and user communications
Service owner Confirms service health, validates functional behavior, and tracks follow-up actions

For a critical incident, designate an incident commander and a technical responder as early as practical. Involve security and privacy stakeholders when sensitive data, credentials, or authorization controls may be affected.

5. Response workflow

The response follows a controlled sequence from detection through learning. Containment and investigation may proceed in parallel when doing so is safe and evidence is preserved.

flowchart TD
    A["Detect and record incident"] --> B["Assess severity and scope"]
    B --> C["Assign incident owner"]
    C --> D["Contain immediate risk"]
    D --> E["Preserve evidence and investigate"]
    E --> F{"Root cause understood and risk controlled?"}
    F -- "No" --> D
    F -- "Yes" --> G["Apply reviewed fix and recover"]
    G --> H{"Security and service checks pass?"}
    H -- "No" --> D
    H -- "Yes" --> I["Communicate resolution"]
    I --> J["Review incident and track actions"]

    classDef process fill:#64748b,stroke:#475569,color:#ffffff
    classDef decision fill:#dbeafe,stroke:#2563eb,color:#1e3a8a
    classDef response fill:#d1fae5,stroke:#059669,color:#064e3b

    class A,C,D,E,G,I,J process
    class B,F,H decision

6. Incident response procedure

6.1 Detect and record

Create an incident record in the approved tracking system as soon as an incident is suspected.

Capture:

  • Incident identifier and detection timestamp, including timezone.
  • Reporter, assigned owner, and current severity.
  • Affected services, environments, integrations, and approximate start time.
  • Observable symptoms, error codes, request IDs, and relevant deployment changes.
  • Known or suspected impact on users, documents, credentials, and provider data.
  • Actions already taken and the outcome of each action.

Use verified observations and clearly distinguish confirmed facts from hypotheses.

Do not include secrets in incident records

Never copy access tokens, refresh tokens, passwords, private keys, or unnecessary sensitive user content into tickets, chat messages, screenshots, or incident summaries.

6.2 Triage and assess impact

Determine what is affected, what remains operational, and whether the incident could extend to other users or services.

Check the following areas where relevant:

  • Authentication, session validation, and role-based authorization.
  • Tenant and user boundaries for document retrieval and tool results.
  • AI planner decisions, tool selection, and authorization enforcement.
  • OAuth grants, token storage, credential exposure, and provider access.
  • Database integrity, queue health, cache behavior, and service availability.
  • Recent releases, configuration changes, dependency updates, and infrastructure events.
  • Data confidentiality, integrity, availability, and potential reporting obligations.

Reassess severity when the impact becomes clearer. If a security boundary may have been crossed, do not wait for complete root-cause analysis before containing the risk.

6.3 Contain the incident

Choose the narrowest containment action that reliably prevents further harm. Escalate to broader isolation when the affected path cannot be safely restricted.

Incident type Potential containment Validation before recovery
Compromised credentials Revoke or rotate affected credentials; restrict associated access Confirm old credentials no longer work and new credentials are securely stored
Unsafe AI tool dispatch Disable the affected tool or dispatch path Verify server-side authorization and tool allowlists reject prohibited actions
Cross-user data exposure Restrict affected retrieval or access paths; isolate impacted data where necessary Test tenant boundaries and verify unauthorized requests are denied
Integration compromise Suspend the affected connector or OAuth grant Confirm access is restricted and token handling is safe
Service outage Isolate the failing component or roll back a risky release Verify dependencies, health checks, and essential user workflows
Suspected data corruption Stop affected writes where safe; preserve a recoverable copy Validate integrity and establish a recovery point before restoring service

Document each action, its authorization, its timestamp, and its observed result.

Containment must not destroy evidence

Preserve relevant logs and metadata before destructive changes when feasible. If ongoing exposure requires immediate action, prioritize safety, record what was changed, and preserve remaining evidence afterward.

6.4 Investigate and preserve evidence

Build a timeline using trustworthy, access-controlled evidence. Correlate application logs, infrastructure telemetry, identity events, provider audit records, and deployment history where available.

Investigation should answer:

  1. What happened, and when did it begin?
  2. Which users, services, integrations, or data categories were affected?
  3. What vulnerability, failure, configuration error, or unsafe behavior enabled the incident?
  4. Was the issue exploited, and is there evidence of continued access?
  5. Which preventive or detective controls failed or were missing?
  6. What evidence supports the findings, and what uncertainty remains?

Preserve original records where possible. Record the source, collection time, collector, relevant request or event identifiers, and any transformations applied to investigative copies.

Restrict access to evidence according to its sensitivity. Follow approved retention, legal-hold, and privacy requirements; do not assume that retaining all application content indefinitely is appropriate.

6.5 Recover safely

Recovery requires more than a successful health check. Validate the security controls and the user-facing workflows affected by the incident.

  • The root cause has been addressed or the remaining risk is explicitly accepted by an authorized owner.
  • The remediation has been reviewed and tested.
  • Credentials have been rotated or revoked where necessary.
  • Authentication, authorization, and tenant-isolation checks pass.
  • Prohibited tool operations remain blocked by server-side controls.
  • Affected data and persistent state have been checked for integrity.
  • Critical dependencies and essential application workflows operate correctly.
  • Monitoring and alerting are adequate to detect recurrence, where implemented.
  • The rollback or renewed-containment procedure is available.

Restore service gradually when practical. Monitor the affected path for recurrence and retain the ability to disable it again.

Do not re-enable a connector or tool solely because the original error has disappeared.

6.6 Communicate

Communications must be accurate, proportionate, and approved through the appropriate organizational process.

Audience Information to communicate
Incident responders Current severity, confirmed facts, actions, blockers, and next steps
Service and security owners Scope, exposure assessment, containment status, and decisions requiring approval
Affected users or customers Relevant impact, protective steps, current status, and approved updates
Regulators or other authorities Required notifications, handled by the designated legal, privacy, or compliance owner

Provide an initial notification when required by organizational policy. Share updates when impact, containment, or recovery status materially changes.

Do not speculate about the cause, promise an unverified recovery time, or disclose investigative details that could create additional risk.

6.7 Close and review

An incident may be closed when:

  • The immediate threat is contained.
  • Service is recovered or a documented, approved alternative is in place.
  • Required security and functional checks have passed.
  • Stakeholder communications and applicable reporting obligations have been addressed.
  • Evidence has been preserved and access appropriately restricted.
  • Corrective actions have owners, due dates, and acceptance criteria.

Prepare a blameless post-incident review that explains system conditions and control failures rather than assigning personal blame. Track corrective work until it is completed and verified.

7. AI and integration-specific incidents

WhiteLotusAI combines AI-generated decisions with authenticated enterprise data and connected-provider capabilities. Treat failures at the tool authorization boundary as security-relevant, even when the model's response appears normal.

Scenario Immediate response Required follow-up
Authorization or confirmation gate bypass Disable the affected tool path and investigate the requests involved Add regression tests at the server-side authorization boundary
Write-capable operation exposed despite a read-only policy Block the operation and inspect affected provider audit records Verify the enforced allowlist and test every exposed tool
Prompt injection attempts to retrieve unauthorized data Restrict the affected path and preserve relevant inputs and outputs securely Test untrusted document and message handling, authorization, and data isolation
OAuth token exposed in logs or source control Revoke or rotate the token and restrict access to the exposure Remove the exposure through the approved process and verify log redaction
Provider data returned to the wrong user Restrict retrieval and assess the full scope of disclosure Verify user identity propagation, ownership checks, and tenant isolation
Model or planner routes a request to an unintended tool Disable the unsafe dispatch path when necessary Test intent classification, tool selection, and server-side permission enforcement
RAG returns unauthorized or stale content Restrict the affected retrieval path if exposure is possible Validate document ownership filters, deletion behavior, and indexing consistency

AI-specific investigation checklist

  • Identify the user, session, request, and tool invocation involved.
  • Establish which server-side identity and authorization checks were applied.
  • Verify that the requested action was allowed independently of model-generated intent or confirmation claims.
  • Determine whether retrieved content contained untrusted instructions or sensitive data.
  • Inspect tool arguments and results using access-controlled evidence handling.
  • Check whether retries, queued work, cached responses, or parallel requests expanded the impact.
  • Add a regression test for the exact failure and relevant neighboring authorization cases.

Security principle: The model may propose an action, but the server-side authorization layer must decide whether that action is permitted.

8. Incident record template

Use this template when creating an incident ticket. Fill in only information that is known; mark unresolved fields as pending rather than guessing.

Incident ID:
Title:
Status:
Severity:
Detected at (timestamp and timezone):
Incident owner:
Technical responder:
Security contact:

Affected environment and services:
Affected integrations:
Potentially affected users or data:
Confirmed facts:
Current hypotheses:
Detection source:
Relevant request/event IDs:

Containment actions and timestamps:
Evidence locations and access restrictions:
Investigation findings:
Root cause:
Recovery and validation results:

Communications and approvals:
Outstanding risks:
Corrective actions and owners:
Target completion dates:
Closure decision and approver:
Post-incident review reference:

9. Post-incident action tracking

Track each corrective action in the approved work-management system.

Field Requirement
Action Specific preventive, detective, or recovery improvement
Priority Risk-based priority consistent with organizational policy
Owner Named accountable individual or team
Due date Agreed target completion date
Acceptance criteria Observable condition that demonstrates completion
Verification Test, review, or operational evidence confirming effectiveness
Status Open, in progress, blocked, or verified complete

Prioritize systemic improvements, such as stronger authorization boundaries, better alerting, safer credential handling, reproducible recovery procedures, and automated regression tests.

10. Readiness and maintenance

Before treating this runbook as operationally ready, verify the following:

  • Incident commander and security escalation contacts are assigned.
  • Severity thresholds and response-time targets are approved.
  • Incident tracking and restricted evidence storage are available.
  • Credential revocation and connector-disable procedures are documented.
  • Service isolation, rollback, and recovery procedures are tested.
  • Relevant security and privacy notification requirements are documented.
  • Incident responders know where to find this runbook.
  • A tabletop exercise or controlled incident simulation has tested the process.

Review this document after significant architecture changes, security incidents, changes to integration permissions, or changes to applicable organizational requirements.


Related operational documentation: Link this section to the approved monitoring, backup and recovery, deployment, security, and troubleshooting pages once their canonical documentation paths and cross-references have been verified.